To date, a series of non-traditional schemes have proliferated in the area of tax law, challenging the widely accepted principles of tax legislation. Lump-sum or presumptive taxes, redemption fees or tax amnesty, corrective taxes (bank levies), or confiscatory taxes (e.g., banker bonuses) can hardly be reconciled with the hard core of tax legislation that is established on the principles of equality and legal certainty. The present paper discusses these unorthodox types of public charges.
The main purpose of the stability savings account is that Hungarian citizens could finance the Hungarian public debt, stabilizing the state budget. This goal looks nice, but the means of achieving it seem to be doubtful. This is because in fact tax amnesty can be obtained in exchange for the payment of HUF five million into this account. 6 As the amount placed on the stability savings account is deemed to be derived at the time of payment, the account owner is liberated from any obligation to square accounts for tax purposes with the amount -or rather with the source of it -paid for this account. The income that is deemed to be derived is, of course, before taxation, or at least it is not precluded that the money paid to the account has not been taxed ever. Tax is applicable to the return made on the invested capital through the stability savings account. The capital itself is considered by law to be made out of sources of income after taxation. As it can be seen, the scheme under discussion is appropriate for regularizing the capital made out of untaxed income in return for some payment into a special account. To make things worse, the release from tax obligations is bound to the condition that payment should be effectuated for public debt securities denominated and kept in HUF (whether by Hungarian or non-Hungarian financial intermediaries). This is clearly to restrict the free movement of capital.
In connection with tax amnesty, it is reasonable to take into account what fiscal neutrality is about (Epstein 1987; Murphy -Nagel, 2004) , and how the redemption of tax liability in return for a one-time payment can be interpreted. It is a further question why the state that introduces tax amnesty is going to give up fiscal neutrality. Tax amnesty is the manifestation of fiscal populism. Hence, populism can exhibit itself not only in the way that special taxes will be levied on the rich, but also in the manner that special fiscal benefits are available for the middle class to be corroborated by public means. One of these is tax amnesty (Deák 2009 ).
Transactional gain
It is the inevitable problem of taxation that even in its best format it distorts economic decisions, although no one can doubt that there are public programs that must be financed by taxes. Disputes cannot be avoided, however, on what the methods of taxation are that distort economic decisions to the smallest extent. Effects that seem to be distorting arise from the fact that, in a situation of free trade economy, it is ideal to reach a balance on an individual scale between the supply of goods or services and the compensation payable for these. In a fiscal economy, however, equality can be interpreted on a social scale, with particular regard to the whole state budget. Even in the circumstances of a balanced state budget, it is not precluded that sharp disputes take place on the desirable directions of fiscal policy.
The power of taxation disturbs to the possibly smallest degree the operation of the free trade economy as long as the liability to pay tax relates to single transactions. Those who obtain gains from transactions, or those in respect of whom there is some value added attached to their transactions, are liable to pay tax on the increase in value. The introduction of the concept of personal income tax made revolutionary changes in the beginning of the 20 th century. In America, it was even necessary to amend the constitution, with the purpose of authorizing the federal state to provide for the liability to pay tax in a way that it would be possible to levy tax on whatever source of wealth. This is problematic in particular because while in case of single transactions it is relatively easy to grasp what is considered income or the value added for tax purposes, the concept of income becomes immediately gloomy if it is assessed based on the sum of the accretion of wealth to be derived from whatever source that can take place at a given time with a given person (Schanz 1896; Haig 1966; Simons 1970) .
Where is this gloominess from? The reason from the dark side of the personal distribution and taxation of income is that it is not actually clear what is the accretion of wealth about. A simple example for these problems is the taxation of dividends. The question can be raised at what time the taxable dividends are realized. Is it the time only, at which taxable dividends are considered to be developed for tax purposes when they are declared and paid? What if they are declared, but not paid out because they will be capitalized? Then, dividends are included in the invested capital. As a consequence, the value of investment is increased that can obviously be considered for tax purposes as income. Further, one can ask whether the company profit can be taxed with the company member, on the payment of which no decision has yet been made by the owners. This question is not absurd at all. It may well occur in a number of jurisdictions that the company member has to pay tax even on the profit that has not yet been distributed. What if securities are acquired, but they are locked-up for a certain time period, and the owner of the securities does not have access, whether directly or indirectly, to any benefit to be derived from the frozen securities during the time of absence? Furthermore, it is assumed that the owner of securities does not have any access to securities, but the dividends derived during the lock-up period will be used to capitalize the investment and, this way increase its value. Is this increase in value taxable?
Windfall gain
It is a fundamental question of tax policy to find a concept of income that is comprehensive enough. This is possible if in an economy everything happens regularly. This is, however, illusionary. What to do with the extraordinary gain that is developed in extraordinary circumstances? This can be considered to be windfall gain for tax purposes. This is in fact a gain derived by chance, or a gift received unexpectedly. If investment were compared to a tree and its yield to the fruit of the tree, profit could be seen as the fruit growing from year to year. What happens, however, if the fruit can be obtained by chance, due to the fact that it has been taken away -let us say -by the wind from an unknown tree, and it can now be found in a particular garden?
In case of windfall gain, an ingenious state can discover itself a particular source of tax. The argument to be mobilized is that it is just to require that the beneficiary should share with the state the extraordinary profit derived in extraordinary circumstances. This is the basis for the introduction of Robin Hood taxes that have been so much popular in recent years. Hungary who has been informed of the fact whether the revenue obtained from the Robin
Hood tax that is levied on the profit of energy suppliers at an extra rate of 11% has been used for social purposes? Or at least has it been used to endow a fund that could support the maintenance and development of the energy network, or the research of alternative resources of energy?
The Robin Hood tax is apparently a means of cheap morality (Beck -Prinz 2010 Robin Hood taxes belong to a series of corrective taxes (Shavell 1993; Bergfeld 2008) . They can be characterized as follows:
-the primary purpose is not to achieve tax revenue, but to apply restrictions on the economic behavior that is not welcome (e.g., activity resulting in extra burden on the environment, or financial hyperactivity carrying systemic risks);
-the performance reflected in the payment of tax is compensated by the state, even if this cannot be interpreted under the laws of the market economy (e.g., the bailout of banks); and -their introduction requires special authorization (because they challenge the democratic principle of the unity of state budget).
It is difficult to put corrective taxes into the traditional armory of fiscal policy. Under solid constitutional circumstances, it is possible to provide for the liability to pay tax within the strict framework of legality, on a high level of legal certainty. While applying corrective taxes, it is problematic that the subject of legal regulation cannot be anticipated very well, and the economic effects of their application cannot always be measured. As a corollary to it, it is doubtful to apply estimation and forecasting in legislation. For example, it is not possible to associate corrective taxes with risky financial activity unless the possible harms can be predicted even in monetary terms. Precise calculation is yet an expectation that can hardly be fulfilled.
It is also problematic that the liability to pay should be associated with the compensation to be made by the state, but this matching can only be made successively (i.e., the payment of tax and compensation given by the state can only be connected at a later time). For example, the cost of the bailout of banks was subsequently collected in many countries from banks by levying compensatory duties on them (clawback). 7 These circumstances contradict the considerations of legal certainty: it could only be possible to introduce tax liability, bound to the conditions that are determined by law preliminarily. In order to remove legal uncertainties, those to whom these measures are addressed seek for special agreements to be made with the public authorities. 8 It is still at the disadvantage of such bargaining that they challenge the equality before the law.
Redemption fee and occasional liability to pay
Redemption is the repeal of sins, resulting in liberation. In this sense, a redemption fee can be associated with tax amnesty: the state renounces requiring the payment of taxes, and penalties, in exchange for the fact that the taxpayer is willing to pay a special fee (and to promise to be honest in the future). Tax amnesty may be good for the taxpayer that comes to conversion, but this is bad news for the society: while public law is leveled down to the subject of bargaining, the considerations of the equality before the law and legal certainty may wither away.
The one-time payment in favor of the state budget can be considered as exceptional within the legal framework of taxation. Tax is a liability, which occurs repeatedly, and the conditions of which are envisaged by law on a high level of abstraction. The payment of a redemption fee is bound, on the contrary, to that special circumstances will be met. Payment will be made here once and for all. This is to challenge legal certainty, and the second maxim of taxation introduced by Adam Smith, according to which the liability to pay tax must be safely predictable and calculable (Smith 1981) .
There is no taxation without the freedom of ownership and parliamentary democracy. The former means that once the state applies restrictions on private property, it can only be complemented in a well-established form. Paradoxically, it is the respect of private property that is reflected in taxation. This is because the citizen is free to dispose of the part of his property that is not subject to tax. The later (parliamentary democracy) refers to the political nature of taxation. It has been clearly presented already in the America of the 18 th century: no taxation without representation.
Before the bourgeois revolutions, in the environment of pre-capitalism, one cannot speak about the economics of taxation. This is because the principles of the freedom of ownership and representative democracy could not come into force, only sporadically (in a monarchy of the estates, the separate ownership of commodities and the parliament that adopts tax laws already exist). In the pre-modern times, it is only the occasional liability to pay which exists.
For example, in ancient Rome, tributes were levied on those who were not fully-fledged Roman citizens. Besides, it was also possible to levy on Roman citizens the occasional liability to pay, based on the census made by tributes. These liabilities were called tribute because the public charges were levied and collected in a system of public administration that consisted of three districts (i.e., of tributes). In modern economies, the second type of tributes can occur, but it can be considered as exceptional. The first type of tributes cannot be interpreted due to the introduction by the 1789 French revolution of the universal equality before the law (Weber 1922; Wittfogel 1962; Seligman 1959; Lütge 1961: 581; Häuser 1975: 15-17) .
It can also happen that the tax authorities deem to disclose the increase in assets (i.e., enrichment) that is not substantiated by the income that has been already taxed. In such cases, it can occur that the tax authorities determine both the basis of tax, and the tax itself by way of estimation (namely, through the reconstruction of taxable income, following the application of circumstantial evidence). This is a particular bias from the standard of legality. Even in such cases, the taxpayer can argue that there is no letter of the tax law, on the basis of which it would be possible to levy tax. Tax avoidance cannot thus be identified unless there are legal provisions to rely on, which provide for the liability to pay tax -malum prohibitum -in advance, and which have been infringed on a level of statutory principles (or on that of judiciary doctrines in common law countries) at least. Despite this high standard, the methods of indirectly measuring income have proliferated in practice all over the world.
Estimation is a presumption that is rebuttable. It is a key issue how much the taxpayer is protected by law, and how easy or difficult it is for the taxpayer to prove the contrary of legislative presumption. Is the taxpayer, on whom the burden of proof is laid, only requested what can be expected in general to do from a man acting with due care, the application of the reconstruction of taxable income by the tax authorities can be justified even from a constitutional perspective.
A one-time duty can be apt not only for the redemption of past tax liability. It can also be used as tax relief, and as a means of fiscal incentives applicable upon tax competition. It can occur, for example, that the normal liability to pay profit tax can be redeemed by way of paying a duty in proportion to the net wealth of the business once a year, or by means of making a payment, based on an agreed sum instead of the normal accounting profit. Such methods can hardly be accepted in the international community, as they can be considered the means of harmful tax competition.
It can also occur that the occasional liability to pay is not associated with the troubles of the citizen, but with those of the entire national economy, and so with those of the state bearing responsibility for them. For example, it was obligatory in Germany to pay for a decade a solidarity surcharge -income tax and social charges to an increased extent -, which served as the basis for financing the development of the Eastern provinces. Such solidarity surcharges were also applied in Hungary for a couple of years, following the global financial crisis that burst out in the autumn of 2008.
A recent example is the Cypriot bank levy, the introduction of which has stirred up general anxiety. The point to the problem is that the withdrawal of 60 or 70 percent of the banking deposits that can be said to be arbitrary is a challenge to the freedom of ownership and legal certainty. Once the levy was declared, leading politicians were swift enough in Germany and elsewhere in Europe in emphasizing that this is a special opportunity that cannot be repeated in another EU Member State.
Rubik agreements
In Both natural persons and businesses are allowed to take their savings to a place where the return on the invested capital is subject to low or no tax. This would not relieve a taxpayer from the obligation to report his or her income in the residence country, and pay tax there accordingly. This is stalled, however, where the financial intermediary does not disclose information of the investment to the tax authorities of the investor's residence country. The
Commission has urged cooperation with the tax authorities of residence countries several
times. An example for its success is the EC Interest Savings Directive. Switzerland was invited to apply the provisions of this directive, and to relax its banking secrecy rules.
The Swiss Bankers' Association elaborated in 2009 a special agreement to be concluded by Switzerland bilaterally. The two main components of it are as follows:
-the past income and property, which has not been taxed anywhere, and which appears in terms of deposits made at Swiss banks can be regularized in exchange for a Swiss lump-sum tax, should the taxpayer so decide, and the Swiss bank does not disclose tax information across the border; and -as to the future, the taxpayer can choose between the option of low tax (in the residence country) and the delivery of international tax information, and the option of a higher tax (in Switzerland), yet without the provision of international tax information.
The European Union exercises pressure on Switzerland to lift its secrecy rules where necessary for international tax purposes. The US has introduced the FATCA rules, 9 according to which non-American financial intermediaries, including Swiss banks, are obliged to give information of non-American investments of American resident taxpayers directly to the Internal Revenue Service.
Hungary is tempted to obtain tax revenue in an area where otherwise there would be no chance for the country to collect revenue. The country should pay, however, for the revenue received this way a serious price: it should assist in the legalisation of dirty money. This is a standpoint that cannot be tenable either ethically or legally. Notably, Hungary would infringe both the EC loyalty requirement and its own effective law on the prohibition of tax amnesty.
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The option of a Rubik agreement destroys civilization: it conceals the fact that the liability to pay taxes means under the rule of law not only the payment of tax, but also the full report of taxable income. As explained by the EC commissioner in charge of tax matters in his circular letter above mentioned, respect of tax law is of higher value than the revenue collected from taxes. Legality of taxation should mean that the taxpayer's conduct is transparent both before the tax authorities and the fellow citizens. Would the state be content barely with the collection of taxes, taxation could hardly be more than a naked matter of theft.
To make things worse, when the Hungarian Government announced its intent to conclude a Rubik agreement, it mixed up two types of taxpayers with each other. Those which belong to the first group have taken money abroad from taxation. Hence, they have cheated the public.
They would be helped out by a tax amnesty as channeled through a Rubik agreement.
Innocent citizens belong to the second group who duly reported their foreign savings to the Hungarian authorities. They have not done so only for the reason of being honest. They want to pay the lower Hungarian tax instead of the high-rate Swiss withholding tax. The Hungarian Government does in fact want to exercise pressure on those who have not availed themselves of the amnesty opportunities advertised before. At the same time, however, the Government's declaration suggests a threat also for the innocent, as they are not able to distinguish between the legal treatments of the two different groups. Anyway, it would not be consistent with the principle of the free movement of capital either to tax investments for the sole reason that they have been made across the border.
Arbitrary state
Tax amnesty is a break with the standards of normativeness and neutrality. As the state is eminent in organizing political and social life, it should obviously be impartial. The basis of the rule of law is, however, that the source of political power can only be the law, the provisions of which are reasonable and predictable. A rational state is expected to be impartial in the context of the rule of law. Measures like tax amnesty that deviate from the normative basis of social regulation are apt to demoralize the state. A populist state does not serve its citizens by acting in a fair and predictable procedure, but it is engaged in providing protection by way of public authority to politically selected groups of the society and the economy. Tax amnesty is launched by a state that appreciates the goods which have financial value, and the holding of which is exclusive. The benefit that can be obtained by tax amnesty is precisely this type of good: the state collects short-term revenue and the citizen availing to tax amnesty will get rid of penalty. In a mass-democracy maintained be a populist state, it is of no interest what will happen next day to the citizen that has availed to tax amnesty and to the state that has launched tax amnesty, and its citizens.
The opportunity of tax amnesty is addressed to those who think of easy and short-term solutions. A contradiction of tax amnesty-related policy cannot be avoided, however:
although the state promises to clear the vices of the past, it does so for the reason only that those who have chosen amnesty should not commit vices any longer. It is not realistic, however, to expect the respectful conduct of those who have already merged into the black -the standard of due process.
In the first case, the respect of human beings is interpreted from the perspective of a theory of realism, meaning the identification of particular communities and their interests in expressing mutual recognition and solidarity. In the latter case, social problems are managed from the perspective of the application of the due process clause. In that instance, the right to fair trial and the standard of equality are highlighted, and placed in a system of the rule of law. This way, a sort of universalism is developed, and emphasis is placed on the standard of the equal treatment before the law.
Dignity and equality are of systemic nature, being invoked in cases only where individual rights cannot be called upon. The protection of human dignity is close to the particular right for the protection of privacy. It cannot be considered as an individual right, however. For constitutional purposes, it is a framework, in which particular rights and obligations of citizens and enterprises, and also the particular measures of State intervention, can be evaluated.
Dignity is an end in itself that appears as absolute respect. It is part of the intimacy of human beings that must not be made contingent on performance of any duty. It represents a value that is innate in the capability of acting, based on free will. Dignity is not a matter of duties and responsibilities. Instead, it may reveal itself in a space for the realization of the self that envisages an individual person as the object of his or her reflective consciousness.
Dignity suggests the substantive aspect of justice. While equality can be presupposed by the right choice of procedures, dignity concerns distributive justice. Taxation can also contribute to the protection of dignity, provided that it can be justified by the values of either efficiency or equity. The application of economic efficiency to taxation ensures a taxation policy that can be substantiated by the general benefit the organizations of the State can provide to the individual. In this respect, it can be explained why the exercise of ownership is subject to constraints. Although the State interferes with private property, it normally complies with the idea of neutrality. According to it, taxation should avoid causing biases in economic decisions. The application of equity to taxation envisages the sacrifice a member of the society is obliged to offer. Therefore, neutrality cannot be tolerated where social imbalances reach a critical level. The liability to pay tribute to the community is to be constrained by the protection of dignity, however.
Making a review of the 98% special tax on income, the Hungarian Constitutional Court sporadically refers 22 to the standard that the state should treat its citizens equally (i.e., equals equally) in cases where it distinguishes between taxpayers -receiving income from the public or private sector;
-deriving income that exceeds a statutory threshold or not; and -obtaining income in 2010 or later, or acquiring income before 2010, to which the special income tax could only apply if it were acceptable that the law on that would be applicable with a retroactive effect.
If the lawfulness of the taxpayer's conduct is examined in individual cases only, one can draw significant conclusions. This way, it is yet possible only to arrive at the statics of law. The dynamics of law can only be explored by preferring a systemic approach. For example, a court may compare an individual case to the standards carved out from a series of earlier cases. For the Hungarian Constitutional Court, it would also be possible to go beyond the realm of particularities, provided that it would be able to animate the equality principle that can be found not only in national, but also in international law as a widely recognized principle of law.
The equality principle is a sharp weapon during a constitutional review, given that tax legislation is expected to show cohesion. While there is not much elbowroom for the scrutiny of the tax law that negotiates vertical equity (Musgrave 1959), it is not so with horizontal equity (Musgrave 2008). As to the former case, fiscal policy determines the accents of the enforcement of distributive justice. Even if the principle of the general share of the public burden is enshrined in the constitution, there can be many reasons for the government in charge to give special meaning to this principle (Happé -Gribnau 2007) .
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In the latter case, consistency of legislation can be required. In respect to the protection of human dignity that serves as a framework for particular values, like the respect for privacy or 22 37/2011. (10.V.) AB, Para. II.3.2. 23 As the Dutch Supreme Court does not test statutes against the principle of ability to pay, it cannot test against the principle of vertical equality either, which is an element of the former.
freedom of conscience, the substantive aspect of distributive justice, or rather the consideration of distributive justice, strictly speaking, can be highlighted. In regard to equality, the logic of procedural justice emerges. Over the span of the recent decades, the latter has grown in its importance. This way, the cohesion of tax legislation has been all the more critical.
Issue of distributive justice versus a matter of the proper operation of law
The values that can be discovered from the directions suggested by the administration of distributive justice and the proper operation of legal mechanisms, may set limits on the exercise of state power, including tax legislation. In the first case (i.e., in case of formulating distributive justice), the state still enjoys much more freedom than in the second case. That is, the government in service may widely appreciate how the substantive values of distributive justice are to be pursued. This is not the case with the infringement of the equality principle that results in deficiencies in the law itself (i.e., in the proper operation of the law). Law cannot survive unless it appears as a system that comprises rules, which are consistent with each other, and which approximate cohesion. These features of law suggest a discipline that is effective among other things for tax legislation.
If the legal dispute identified concerns itself with a problem of distributive justice, it is not enough just to refer to the protection of human dignity. This is because the latter represents a value that is too abstract and speculative. It must be enlivened by the particular values of the protection of privacy, the freedom of conscience or the guaranteed rights of citizens. For fiscal law purposes, it is even required to be more specific. Therefore, it should also be examined to what degree economic and social rights can be enforced in a legal order. It is not by chance that the freedom of ownership and the right for social security have been invoked in the ECtHR instance.
The Hungarian constitution in effect prevents the Constitutional Court from raising the principle of equality in tax matters because it is prohibited to review tax laws unless they are directly connected with the protection of human rights. 24 This is serious restriction on the constitutional scrutiny of tax laws. To be worse, the standard arising from the protection of the human dignity cannot be substantiated by referring to the freedom of ownership and the right for social security. As the examination of the proper operation of law is precluded and the protection of human dignity cannot be animated by particular economic and social rights, currently it cannot be expected that tax legislation could be subject to effective constitutional review in Hungary. This means that an important pillar lacks in the system of checks and balances, ensuing the deficiency of both the rule of law and political democracy, the importance of which goes beyond taxation.
Concluding remarks
As discussed in this paper, tax amnesty makes it impossible for public authorities to act impartially, as it violates the equality before the law principle and debilitates legal certainty.
Further, the balanced-budget provision on a conditional levy makes a threat for the balance of powers. This way, it encroaches upon democracy. Finally, confiscatory taxes undermine the respect of property, a fundamental value of a country's constitutional order. It also corrupts the good operation of a national tax system as long as the direct state interference with private matters appears in the disguise of taxes. In a world without unorthodoxy, no form of taxation as discussed in this paper can occur.
The number of examples for unorthodox taxes has in Hungary reached a level, above which one can conclude that these taxes have already constituted a new system of taxation.
Progression has been thrown away in Hungary. This is yet inconsistent with the ability-to-pay principle, and in broader terms, with that of fairness in taxation. Strictly proportional taxes, focusing only on earned income, but neglecting the taxpayer's social environment, hit the poor because they have to spend a higher portion of their wealth to meet the liability to pay tax than the rich.
It seems reasonable to expect that social differences should not be bigger after taxation than they were before taxation. Proportional taxes disregard this consideration. As a consequence and human being, the protection of personal data, the freedom of conscience and religious belief, or of the rights connected to the Hungarian citizenship. The Constitutional Court is authorized to annul even the laws falling within the above scope without limitation, provided that the criteria that apply to the creation and promulgation of these laws, as determined by the constitution are not fulfilled.
of the application of proportional taxes, the poor will be all the poorer, and the rich will be all the richer. This is not favorable for the purposes of maintaining social harmony.
Under unorthodoxy, the function of taxation is reduced because taxation policy is purely adjusted to the logic of the exchange in simple material values. More sophisticated thoughts on social balancing and justice are neglected. They would be based on the idea that taxation should do correction in the relationships as developed in the course of market-oriented transactions. Unorthodoxy focuses, on the contrary, on those who are able to acquire material goods, and those who are unable for any reason remain out of the scope of public attention. This is a bad message for the purposes of taking care about social security.
As the country is an importer of capital, the Hungarian Government would like to expedite savings. Therefore, as long as the income earned is not consumed, people are not punished by taxes. For lack of the application of progressive tax rates, the Government has still to face a remarkable loss of revenue. In order to approximate a budgetary balance, it seeks to compensate the losses it has suffered for lack of tax progression by laying stress on indirect taxation.
It is lucky that VAT is neutral. Although it lays much burden on enterprises, it does not distort economic decisions. This is not the case with special industry levies (bank levy, financial transaction duty, telecom tax, energy supplier's Robin hood tax, pharmaceuticals' contribution, retail store tax, etc.), however. They do not only represent a high burden of taxation, but they also lack neutrality. The combined effect of the large volume of taxation and missing neutrality is that taxation constitutes a major barrier to investments and, eventually, economic growth.
The Hungarian tax policy that lays stress on indirect taxes and, in particular, on special industry levies suffers from two major insufficiencies: it fails to meet the requirements of both fairness and neutrality. This is strange because once a country is weak in fairness, it achieves neutrality in taxation and, vice versa, where taxation lacks neutrality, it may be aimed at fairness. This is not true for unorthodox legal and tax policies. Such a tax policy does not seem to be able to survive in the long run, however. At the same time, unorthodoxy is also responsible for undermining democratic procedures and the mechanisms of the rule of law, as
shown through a number of examples above.
There is an inherent contradiction in the course of tax policy followed under unorthodoxy.
The principle of fairness in taxation is forgone, being subordinated to the idea that those who earn must not be punished by taxes. It is not yet able at the same time to support the development of the market economy because the state interferes with economic decisions both by special industry levies and non-tax related administrative measures. The selected groups of the middle class should be protected by administrative means against competition with foreign enterprises. This entails still demolishing instrumental rationality that would maintain market-oriented decision-making.
Unorthodox tax policy is aimed at applying the fiscal incentive that someone is not taxed as long as his/her income is not withdrawn for consumption. Lack of sufficient capital makes a harsh constraint on economic growth, however. This problem can be managed for a certain time by state intervention. Focus is then made on current problems. Long-run considerations are neglected. For lack of competition and pluralism, the political system is not able to provide mechanisms which would compel correction of this short-sided policy. This inevitably leads to a situation where the future is devoured.
The double insufficiency of injustice and arbitrariness cannot be managed, only in the short run. Real problems can thus be hidden for some time. There is no solution for striking a balance in the long-term, however. Unorthodoxy is a policy of the current time, allured by the very moment. As it does not contain mechanisms of self-correction, it is blind to the future. This is more than disquieting.
